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NOTES
"WHEN ONE OF TWO INNOCENT PARTIES MUST
SUFFER BY THE ACT OF A THIRD."
When a rule or proposition of law is mentioned so often
by judges in their opinions that it becomes a common expres-
sion, we find it being applied to all like cases without regard
*"When one of two innocent parties must suffer by the act of a third, the
party who has enabled such third person to occasion the loss must sustain it."
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to the truth or underlying principles of the proposition. Such
is the case in the well known expression which is the title of
this note. The continuous application of such a proposition
has the effect of creating a precedent and often confronts one
who may fail to understand the legal principle on which a
case should be decided.
After a perusal of the outstanding cases in which the
rule has been set forth, it will be found that, although it is
referred to as the decisive principle, nevertheless, it can be
found from the cases that the courts have actually decided
the cases upon entirely different rules of law than the one
mentioned.
The purpose of this note, therefore, is an examination
of some of the leading cases in which this proposition is
announced, in order to show that it is not an established
principle of law and that the cases have been actually decided
upon other grounds.
The proposition is most frequently mentioned in cases
involving the liability of parties to commercial paper,, but it
is also referred to in cases dealing with the fraudulent acts
of agents, and the unauthorized issuance of corporate stock.
Many of the cases confuse it with the doctrine of equitable
estoppel, and the two rules are sometimes mentioned indis-
criminately.
This so-called rule of law originated in the English case
of Lickbarrow v. Mason.' This was a case involving the right
of stoppage in transitu as between the consignor and the
assignee of the consignee's bill of lading. T. shipped a
cargo of corn by boat to Liverpool, four bills of lading being
made out, two being given to T., one being sent to F., the
consignee, and the other being retained by the master of the
ship. T. drew bills of exchange on F. for the value of the
cargo. F. negotiated his bill of lading to the plaintiff. F.
became insolvent, and the bills drawn on him by T. were
1. 2 T. R. 70.
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unpaid. T., upon hearing of the insolvency of F., indorsed
his remaining bill of lading over to the defendant, to take
possession of the goods upon their arrival in Liverpool. The
defendant got possession of the goods and refused to deliver
them to the plaintiff who, therefore, brought an action in
trover. It was held by the court that T. could have stopped
the goods in transitu because of the insolvency of F., but
after F. assigned his bill of lading to a third party for
value, the right, as between the consignor and such assignee,
was gone. It was there said by Lord Ashurst: "We lay it
down as a broad general principle, that whenever one of two
innocent parties must suffer by the acts of a third, he who
has enabled such third person to occasion the loss must
sustain it."
It is significant that in the very case in which the doctrine
is first enunciated, the court decided the case by laying down
a basic principle of the law of sales, and the doctrine which
Lord Ashurst referred to was not the ground of decision in
the case.
In Allen v. South Boston B. B. Co.,2 the treasurer of the
railway corporation fraudulently issued certificates of stock
without authority and the purchasers of the stock were
allowed- to recover from the corporation. The Court said
in part of the opinion: "When one of two innocent parties
must suffer a loss from the fraud of a third, the loss must
be borne by him whose negligence enabled the third person
to commit the fraud." In that case the mere mention of
negligence is sufficient to make the corporation liable, and
the fact that there is negligence takes the case out of the rule
which the court attempts to apply as between innocent parties.
In Friedlander v. Texas & Pacific R. R. Co.,' the railroad
was held not liable for the fraud of its agent in issuing a
false bill of lading without receiving any goods. Although
the court noted the same proposition, the decision was based
2. 150 Mass. 200.
3. 130 U. S. 416.
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on the principle of the law of agency, that the principal is
not liable for fraud perpetrated by his agent in his individ-
ual capacity and not within the scope of his employment.
Again in New York Iron Mine v. Negaunee Bank4 the
court spoke of the liability on the part of one enabling another
to commit a fraud. But the decision was to the effect that
the mere act of conferring an authority that may be properly
delegated does not constitute such negligence as to make one
innocent party who confers such power responsible for a
loss caused to another by the agent's dishonesty; nor can
he be responsible if the other party has been negligent.
In Peake v. Thomas5 a husband and wife joined in a
mortgage of their farm and the husband later became insol-
vent. In a foreclosure suit brought by the plaintiff as
mortgagee, the wife set up as a defense that, although the
mortgage covered the homestead, that the homestead was
her separate property and she had signed the mortgage under
a misapprehension because she failed to understand the mean-
ing of the description of the land in the mortgage. The
Court said: "Whenever one of two innocent parties must
suffer by the act of a third, the loss shall be borne by that
one whose behavior in the matter denoted to the other that
such third person's doings were worthy of trust according to
their outward appearance." However, the rule upon which
the case is decided is stated later in the case to be: "What-
ever may be the actual intention of a party to a transaction,
if he so conducts himself in regard thereto as to lead a reason-
able person to believe that he understands and assents to its
terms, and if the other party so believing fully performs on
his part in conformity with the view so indicated, the former
is precluded from asserting that he did not understand and
assent, and is bound." Thus the actual ground of decision
in the case is that the defendant is estopped to deny that the
land in controversy was covered by the terms of the mortgage.
4. 39 Mich. 644.
5. 39 Mich. 584.
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The ruling as given in the above ease and in most of the
cases where the proposition appears, is an entirely different
doctrine than that originally laid down in Lickbarrow v.,
Mason, supra, and, therefore, does not sustain it.
The doctrine has received no support by the courts of
Missouri and was repudiated in the case of Southern Com-
merciat Savings Bank v. Slattery's Administer0 In that
case one Lange executed to Renner eleven promissory notes;
one for $20,000 due five years after date, and, ten interest
notes for the sum of $600 each. At the same time he executed a
deed of trust to secure payment of the notes, whereby certain
land was conveyed to a trustee. Renner indorsed the notes
without recourse and Lange took possession of them. Lange
negotiated the deed of trust and the notes to the plaintiff
bank, but it allowed him to keep possession of the deed of
trust upon his representation that he would take it to be
recorded. He later returned and stated that he had
had it recorded and producing a recorder's receipt, said that
he would bring a certified copy of it to the bank. For some
unexplained reason, he was permitted to retain this receipt.
Some time later Lange procured the defendant Slattery
to indorse a note for $4000 giving him as security a set of
notes of the same description as those mentioned in the deed
of trust and the recorder's receipt. Upon the death of Lange,
it was found that there was but one deed of trust and that
both Slattery and the bank held on identical sets of notes
with those referred to in the deed of trust. Slattery asked
for an execution upon the trust property, but it was held
that the bank was entitled to the security of the deed of
trust.
The defendant contended that the plaintiff by his negli-
gence in permitting Lange to carry away the deed of trust
and in failing to get back the receipt from the recorder of
deeds, put it in his power to defraud others, and the bank
6. 166 Mo. 620.
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ought to bear the loss which must fall upon one of two
innocent parties. It was held that the rule advanced by the
defendant would not apply since there was nothing to indicate
that the plaintiff had any knowledge of Lange's intention to
commit a fraud and the rule is always based on knowledge.
The bank had a legal right to entrust the deed of trust to
Lange for the purpose of having it recorded and were not
bound to anticipate that he would be dishonest.
Surely if there is such a rule of law it would have been
applied as the principle of decision in this case. The court,
however, expressly stated that knowledge by the party to
be charged was necessary, and since knowledge is necessary,
the doctrine was of no avail.
It is inconceivable that a person who has not been at
fault or negligent in the slightest degree can be held liable
because of the circumstances in which he may be situated.
To invoke such a rule, the party to be charged must be
negligent and have caused the loss through his legal wrong.
The statement of the proposition is "when one of two
innocent parties must suffer by the act of a third, the party
who has enabled such third person to occasion the loss must
sustain it." If both parties are innocent and guilty of no
legal wrong, the law should permit the loss to rest where
it has fallen.
The proposition is neither based on sound theory nor
public policy and results in confusion, uncertainty, and in-
justice in the law. Considerations of fair dealing and free-
dom in business activities are directly opposed to it. It is
almost unnecessary to say that although this proposition is
often called a principle of law or a maxim, it is of neither
class since it fails to appear in any authoritative statement
of the law or in any of the famous books of maxims. It is
said of all laws, that when the reason for the law ceases to
exist, the law itself must fail. There being no possible reason
or principle for this doctrine regarding innocent parties, the
doctrine itself should be expunged from the law.
JAMES F. BRADY, '25.
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